Legal strategy: The driver of legal change

Patent reform is back in the news as both the House and Senate have proposed their own versions of legislation in this complex legal area. The aim of patent reform is to further curtail the activities of the so-called patent trolls, which are companies that own patents, do not make any products and use patent law to sue large companies to collect jury verdicts or settlements. 

Since technology and innovation are growing in importance as drivers of wealth creation, it is natural that patent law would rise in importance. Since the economic stakes have increased, so have the stakes in the political and legal arenas. This could all be predicted by anyone who observes how powerful parties try to alter the legal and political system for their own advantage. From an academic standpoint, this was marvelously theorized and explained by the pioneers in the field of non-market strategy, who deduced the importance of engaging the legal, regulatory and legislative system as a form of strategic behavior. 

My recent writings in legal strategy support the view that law can be used to achieve competitive advantage. My most recent work addresses the abusive aspects of this practice and ways that can limit what I call “strategic legal bullying.”

What’s fascinating to me is that legal strategy is indirectly driving some important political wrangling in the current iteration of patent reform. From press accounts I’ve read, a hedge fund manager is using a transformative legal strategy to exploit a process to challenge drug patents while betting against the drug companies’ stock. Now, the drug companies want a legislative carve-out in place that would shield them from these administrative challenges. Their reaction to the hedge fund manager’s legal strategy is to change the law as it applies to their industry. 

What I’m starting to realize is that legal strategy has often been the agent of legal change, for better or worse. Think of Sony, Napster, Aerio, Uber, Tesla and the “patent trolls.” Their business models are closely tied to legal strategy. In some cases they successfully enacted legal change, and in other cases the status quo prevailed. The systems where this strategic behavior takes place is complex, consisting of companies, courts, administrative agencies, the media, and the legislature. Legal strategy lies at the core of the process and helps parties re-write the rules of the game, or at least try to do that. 

Apple’s Victory is One for Pioneering Designers

As reported by The Wall Street Journal, Apple won its long-anticipated jury trial against Samsung on Thursday and was awarded $1.05 billion in damages by a jury. I think it is highly unlikely that the decision will be overturned on appeal, so the case is likely to establish an important precedent, as I anticipated in an earlier post I wrote in 2011. My prediction then, however, was that Apple would win through a private settlement instead of a jury verdict.

I predicted a private settlement because of the high stakes involved and the risks open to both companies if the issue ultimately was taken to a jury. Apple’s risk was that the jury would invalidate some or all of the patents it had asserted, a defensive maneuver that Samsung adopted during litigation. Samsung’s risk was that it would be found to have infringed Apple’s patents by copying user interfaces and other design aspects of Apple’s products. In the end, and to the surprise of many, both companies rolled the die and Apple came out on top.

The $1.05 billion verdict is a big coup, not just for Apple, but for product designers in general. For a long time, product design was perceived in industry and in legal policy-making circles as an intellectual property and strategic backwater. That has changed, however, due to consumers’ increasing aesthetic sophistication and a crowded global marketplace.

Design is starting to play an essential role in product differentiation and branding. An empirical study I conducted with two marketing scholars in 2009, published in The Journal of Marketing, found a positive association between trademark ownership and financial performance. This link between the two suggests that companies which pay attention to the legal aspects of branding through trademark registration reap greater rewards.

Elsewhere, I have written about the rare capability within firms that generates product shape trademarks. Product shape and packaging trademarks, often referred to as “trade dress,” were among the arrows in Apple’s legal quiver in the Samsung trial. I believe the Apple-Samsung case signals that product design and trademarks will be increasingly applied during new product development and asserted during litigation among companies across industries.

I make a career of teaching legal studies to business students. In my lectures, I invariably cover the subject of intellectual property management and strategy. Had Samsung won at trial against Apple, I would have cynically advocated what I perceived as Samsung’s business and intellectual property strategy. That is, I would have advocated in favor of free-riding from an industry leader to quickly gain a foothold and increase market share. Had Samsung won, this strategy would be effective, since the risks of infringement and damages would have been minimal. Once the fast follower and design imitator establishes their foothold, they can then compete against the innovator based on a cost advantage. From a business perspective, this clearly would have been an effective tactic.

Given Apple’s victory, however, Samsung’s strategy is no longer risk free or optimal. Instead, a better strategy is to be aware of competitor’s intellectual property rights and embrace innovation. This will require investing in design capabilities to distinguish products, which is how Apple secured its leadership position.

A copycat strategy may still be adopted by firms that want to quickly enter a technology market, such as mobile devices. After the Apple-Samsung case, however, that strategy became significantly riskier, much to to the benefit of pioneering innovators everywhere.

Research Spotlight: Friends of the court: Using Amicus Briefs to Identify Corporate Advocacy Positions in Supreme Court Patent Litigation

Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management profiled my recent publication, co-authored with Kellogg faculty member James Conley. This work examines amicus (friend of the court) briefs submitted during U.S. Supreme Court patent litigation, and published in the University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy.

Research Spotlight: Beyond the Board of Directors

In a Wake Forest Law Review article, FSU Law professor Kelli Alces provides a novel and intriguing recommendation to re-shape how corporations are governed in America. Her recommendation is to eliminate the board of directors as the ultimate decision-maker. From a legal realism perspective, which looks at human behavior as a driver of legal outcomes, it is worth rethinking the value and efficacy of the board as the supreme governing body in Corporate America. As professor Alces mentions:

“A firm’s investors and other influential constituents use their contract rights against the firm to influence management and monitor management more carefully than the board can to protect their interests and investments in the firm.”

Delaware corporate law and other statutes, however, require that corporations be governed by a board with some independent members. Investors and entrepreneurs who want to opt out of this structure may opt for the limited liability company, or LLC. LLCs, unlike corporations, do not require a board as the ultimate overseers of business decisions. Under LLC law, the owners may delegate or assign responsibility among themselves, or to managers.

Professor Alces’ paper is accessible on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), here.

Research Spotlight: Empirically Testing Scotchmer’s Theory of Sex-Based Risk Aversion

This post will inaugurate a new feature of this blog. At times, whenever I come across a paper or research talk that poses an interesting legal finding or issue, I’ll profile it as a research spotlight. To kick off this feature, I’ll discuss a paper written by a colleague at Florida State University.

Today I attended a talk at the FSU Law School at which Professor Dino Falaschetti presented his paper: “A Difficulty in the Concept of Affirmative Action: Evidence from Females in Legislatures”. The paper empirically tests Suzanne Scotchmer’s theory, which posits that: “(1) winner-take-all games (e.g., promotions in hierarchies) favor inherently risk-taking males, but (2) successful females maintain greater skill on average and (3) see this skill-advantage depreciate with repeated play.”

The paper makes a contribution since the theory has rarely ever been empirically tested. A clever experiment was designed using elections in legislatures in both majoritarian (winner take all) vs. proportional election systems. The U.S. follows the majoritarian electoral system, where the candidate who garners the majority (> 50%) votes wins. Many, if not most, countries follow a proportional system whereby parties and their candidates obtain representation in proportion to the votes they obtain.

The article’s findings suggest a statistically significant result that demonstrates a negative correlation between elected female legislators and winner take all (majoritiarian) electoral systems across time and 130 countries . Ultimately, the author positions these findings as challenging the outcomes of affirmative action programs, since gender may ultimately lead to unintentional results due to the outcomes generated by risk preferences unique to gender type.  I think the paper may also raise some interesting questions related to institutional economics, given that similar outcomes were seen across a broad spectrum of societies and cultures

The link to the article on SSRN is here.